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POST-MORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN ARKANSAS:
PROTECTING AGAINST THE UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A
PERSON'S IDENTITY FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
Rashauna A. Norment*
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE POST-MORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY1
The right of publicity protects against the use of a person's name, iden-
tity, likeness, or other personal characteristics (collectively, the "identity")
for commercial purposes, without that person's consent.2 A person's identity
may arise from the "fruit of his labor" and is considered a type of property
entitled to legal protection Depending on the jurisdiction at issue, the right
of publicity may apply to private individuals, celebrities, public figures, or
public officials.'
The term "right of publicity" was first recognized in 1953. 5 Since then,
many states have adopted a statutory right of publicity6 or have recognized it
* Rashauna A. Norment is a registered patent attorney with Calhoun Law Firm. Her
areas of practice include preparing and prosecuting patent applications and trademark regis-
tration applications before the United States Patent and Trademark Office and counseling
clients concerning copyright protection and registration. She provides counseling concerning
other related business matters, such as business start-up and expansion, and enforcement of
intellectual property. She also assists in civil litigation and in drafting agreements. She would
like to thank her family and friends for their continuing prayers, support, and encouragement.
She would also like to thank Joe Calhoun, managing partner of Calhoun Law Firm, for his
guidance and mentorship.
1. The focus of this article is limited to adoption of a post-mortem right of publicity in
Arkansas, and a preliminary look to other jurisdictions for guidance. Other considerations,
such as first amendment rights, defamation, and contributory infringement should be consid-
ered separately.
2. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953); Uhlaender v. Hendrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Minn. 1970).
3. Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1282.
4. Melodee Henderson, Publicity Rights in Michigan: A Set of Considerations for Mov-
ing Right of Publicity Legislation to the Front of the Bus, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 211, 212
(2007).
5. See Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868.
6. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
28:17 n. 1 (4th ed. 2011) (listing California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennes-
see, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
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under common law. 7 Most of these jurisdictions consider the right of public-
ity to be personal property.8 Some also allow the right of publicity to survive
after the person's death,9 passing according to the person's will or trust, or
under intestate succession. ° Three states that have a statutory or common
law post-mortem right of publicity are Tennessee," Georgia, and Califor-
nia.' 3 Such rights may be invoked to prevent unjust enrichment by those
who do not have consent to use a person's identity. 4 The right of publicity
also protects the value of contracts others may have for use of a person's
identity. 1' Remedies for one who prevails on a right of publicity claim in-
clude damages, injunctive relief, and impoundment or destruction of the
materials in question. 16 This article advocates that Arkansas adopt a post-
mortem right of publicity for everyone, and discusses a few jurisdictions
that have already done so. Consequently, considerations such as possible
preemption of the right of publicity by the First Amendment or the Copy-
right Act will not be addressed here.
1 7
A. Arkansas Does Not Recognize a Post-Mortem Right of Publicity
As of this writing, Arkansas does not provide statutory or common law
protection for a right of publicity that is descendible. Therefore, a person in
Arkansas, generally, must rely on other intellectual property rights in an
attempt to protect his identity. 8 Some have also relied on the right of priva-
cy to protect his or her image.' 9 However, none of these can substitute for a
post-mortem right of publicity. An Arkansas statute setting forth the pa-
7. Id. at § 28:16 (listing Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin).
8. E.g., Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.
1983).
9. Henderson, supra note 4, at 220.
10. Id. at 226.
11. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l. Mem'l. Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97-99
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
12. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 694 F.2d
674, 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
13. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001); see
also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344-3344.1 (Westlaw through ch. 4 of 2012 Reg. Sess.).
14. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 805.
15. See generally id.
16. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
17. For an article discussing such considerations, see Henderson, supra note 4.
18. Intellectual property includes statutory and common law protection for trademarks,
and statutory protection for copyrights.
19. E.g., Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 497-498 (1962); Stanley v.
Gen. Media Commc'ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, *706 (W.D. Ark. 2001).
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rameters for a post-mortem right of publicity, a cause of action for violation
of the same, and remedies would be greatly beneficial. Further, this would
provide guidance to individuals and third parties as to what is an acceptable
or unlawful use of a person's identity. 0
For some individuals, economic or commercial value in his or her iden-
tity may not be commercially valuable until after death. By Arkansas' adop-
tion of a post-mortem right of publicity, people can rest assured that the
value of his or her identity would be protectable after death, and beneficial
to heirs. Arkansas should not wait until someone who has considerable fame
or notoriety dies before it adopts a post-mortem right of publicity. Until
statutory protection is available, Arkansas courts should adopt such a right.
An example of how this post-mortem right of publicity would have
benefitted an Arkansas native and resident is the case of the late U.S. Army
First Lieutenant Tyler Parten.2' Parten attended high school in Marianna,
then graduated with high honors from the United States Military Academy
in West Point; by all accounts, First Lieutenant Parten was a larger-than-life
persona, endowed with the physical prowess, mental toughness and creative
intelligence to exude the charismatic leadership he provided to his recon-
naissance/combat platoon. While stationed in Afghanistan, Parten main-
tained journals and penned poems and musical compositions, some of which
he recorded. Truly a warrior poet, he also kept in contact with his family and
friends whenever possible, sending them copies of his works. On September
10, 2009, Parten was killed in action in Afghanistan.
The Tyler Parten Foundation was established in his honor to carry on
his legacy of "promoting peace, one child at a time." After Parten's passing,
many people learned about his incredible story of service and sacrifice, and
became acquainted with his songs and writings. Some people attempted to
commercialize on his valiant identity by linking it with their products or
commercial endeavors. Current Arkansas law provides no direct means for
prohibiting or controlling other's use of Parten's name or persona. In partic-
ular, a claim for an invasion of Parten's privacy by appropriation would not
be available because this right did not survive his death.
Indirect means were needed to provide some modicum of control. Un-
der Arkansas law, Parten's parents inherited his personal property, including
the copyrights in his literary and musical works, and the recordings of his
performances; those copyrights were registered at the Library of Congress.
Parten's family also established Tyler Parten Initiatives, LLP (TPI), in con-
nection with charitable and memorial fundraising like the Tyler Parten
20. For an article discussing such considerations, see Henderson, supra note 4.
21. To learn more about First Lieutenant Tyler Parten or the Tyler Parten Foundation,
see THE TYLER PARTEN FOUNDATION, http://www.thetylerpartenfoundation.com (last visited
Feb. 10, 2012).
2012]
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Foundation; TPI also manages Parten's intellectual property, such as the
copyrights in his creative works. Since a photograph of Tyler Parten's face
was used in connection with TPI's services and promotion, it was registered
at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office as a service mark of TPI.2 2 If Arkan-
sas had recognized a post-mortem right of publicity, however, then TPI may
have been able to more easily prevent unauthorized commercial use of Ty-
ler' s identity.
B. The Eighth Circuit's Approach to the Right of Publicity
Case law discussing a right of publicity or a post-mortem right of pub-
licity is limited in the Eighth Circuit. In Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc.,23 the
plaintiff, Jesse "The Body" Ventura, worked as a wrestler for Titan and later
as a color commentator.24 The defendant, Titan Sports, had licensed use of
the league wrestler's identity for merchandise 25 Ventura believed that he
was entitled to royalties for the use of his likeness on videotapes produced
by Titan.26 He filed a complaint in a Minnesota state court against Titan,
alleging misappropriation of publicity rights, fraud, and quantum meruit.
27
Titan Sports removed the case to federal court.28 The quantum meruit claim
was submitted to the jury, but the jury was only given a special verdict form
concerning misrepresentation of publicity rights. 29 The jury determined that
Titan exploited Ventura's name, voice or likeness in Titan's merchandise
and that Titan had defrauded Ventura.3" The jury awarded damages to Ven-
tura to compensate for Titan's exploitation.3 The district court vacated the
jury verdict, finding that Ventura was not entitled to a jury trial on his quan-
tum meruit claim. 32 The district court then entered findings of fact and con-
clusions of law that were consistent with the jury verdict; Titan Sports ap-
pealed to the Eighth Circuit.33
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the right of privacy from
the right of publicity. The right of privacy protects "the privacy and solici-
tude of a private personae from the mental distress that accompanies unde-
22. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 4,080,743.
23. Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 728.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Ventura, 65 F.3d at 728.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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sired publicity."34 In contrast, the right to publicity "protects the ability of a
public personae to control the types of publicity that they receive."35 Thus, it
"protects pecuniary, not emotional, interests."36 "As such, the policy under-
lying the right to publicity is ... [similar] to the policy underlying the pro-
tection of trade names, which Minnesota recognize[d]. '37 The court held that
although Minnesota had not adopted a right of publicity, or even one of the
categories for an invasion of privacy, it was persuaded that if the issue were
raised, the Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt such a right.38 Conse-
quently, the Eighth Circuit court determined that Titan Sports violated that
right of publicity. 39
In Sharp-Richardson v. Boyds Collection, Ltd., ° an Iowa district court
cited Ventura as an example of a court predicting that a state supreme court
would recognize the right of publicity. 4' Here, the plaintiff, Gae Sharp-
Richardson, was a professional teddy bear artist who held copyright registra-
tions for her animal "Hudson Bear" and other animal designs.42 The defend-
ant, the Boyds Collection ("Boyds"), contacted Sharp-Richardson, express-
ing an interest in purchasing her designs.43 Boyds signed a contract with
Sharp-Richardson to license her designs in exchange for a royalty on sales
on all products bearing her designs. 44 Unbeknownst to Sharp-Richardson,
Boyds was already manufacturing and marketing knock offs bearing her
designs.4" Sharp-Richardson filed suit in Iowa state court for breach of con-
tract, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, and invasion
of privacy.46 Boyds removed to federal court.47 The district court denied
Boyds's motion to dismiss the fraudulent misrepresentation claim and the
invasion of privacy claim.4 8 Boyds then moved for partial summary judg-
ment on the breach of contract claim, and for summary judgment on the
fraud claims and the invasion of privacy claim.49
34. Id. at 730.
35. Ventura, 65 F.3d at 730.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. No. C 96-0344 MJM, 1999 WL 33656875 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 1999).
41. Id. at*16.
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Sharp-Richardson, 1999 WL 33656875, at *2.
47. Id. at *1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
20121
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On her invasion of privacy claim, Sharp-Richardson argued that Boyds
used her identity "to promote its products for which it never paid and/or
were not derived from her designs."5 She further argued that Boyds's ap-
propriation of her image caused her "damage and that the publicity placed
her in a false light."51 To prevail on a right of publicity claim, a plaintiff
must prove: (1) Defendant appropriated the Plaintiffs name or likeness for
the value associated with it, and not in an incidental manner or for a news-
worthy purpose; (2) Plaintiff can be identified from the publication; and (3)
there was some advantage or benefit to Defendant.52
The Sharp-Richardson court noted that Iowa courts had not specifically
recognized a right of publicity. 53 It further opined that Iowa already recog-
nized a common law cause of action for invasion of privacy54 and predicted
that the Iowa Supreme Court would probably allow a claim for violation of a
right of publicity to proceed." The court then held that Sharp-Richardson
had raised "genuine issues for trial on every element of the 'right of publici-
ty' claim" and denied Boyds's motion for summary judgment on this
claim.56
Neither of these cases address whether the right of publicity is descend-
ible and inheritable in its respective states. If Arkansas seeks to adopt a post-
mortem right of publicity, a look to other jurisdictions on their approach to
the post-mortem right of publicity may be instructive. California, Tennessee,
and Georgia are examples of such jurisdictions that have already adopted a
post-mortem right of publicity.
II. OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND THE POST-MORTEM RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Defining the Right of Publicity
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 57 was one of
the first cases to address the right of publicity. In Haelan, the plaintiff, a
seller of chewing gum, entered into a contract with a baseball player, giving
the plaintiff "the exclusive right to use the ball-player's photograph in con-
nection with the sales of plaintiff's" products.58 The defendant, one of the
plaintiff's competitors, deliberately induced the ball player to enter into a
50. Id. at*13
51. Id.
52. Sharp-Richardson, 1999 WL 33656875, at *15.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
58. Id. at 867.
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separate agreement to use the player's photograph during the term of the
plaintiff's contract.5 9 The Second Circuit noted that the right of publicity is
independent of the right of privacy. 60 A person has rights in the publicity
value in his photograph, which may be transferred "in gross. '61 The court
opined that the right of publicity is not about a person's feelings being
bruised but rather being deprived if he "no longer received money for au-
thorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. 62 Thus, a right of pub-
licity allows a person to make an exclusive grant to use his image.63
B. Tennessee and the Post-Mortem Right of Publicity
Tennessee has adopted statutory and common law protection for the
right of publicity. 64 This right is descendible and inheritable.65 One of the
most notable lines of cases concerning application of the post-mortem right
of publicity is State ex rel. Elvis Presley International Memorial Foundation
v. Crowell.66
1. Elvis Presley and Common Law Post-Mortem Right of Publicity
The Presley estate owned the copyrights and trademarks relating to
Elvis Presley's works. 67 The estate still sought to protect the entertainment
icon's identity through his right of publicity, arguing that this right was de-
scendible upon his death.68
Elvis Presley capitalized on his identity during his lifetime.69 He en-
tered into various contracts granting exclusive commercial licenses to use
his identity throughout the world in connection with the marketing and sale
of merchandise and other memorabilia.7 0 For example, his name and like-
ness were found on clothing, jewelry, and many other items, earning mil-
lions of dollars for himself, his licensees, and business associates. In 1981,
59. Id.
60. Id. at 868.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868.
64. Henderson, supra note 4, at 218, 225-26.
65. Id. at 225-26.
66. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987).
67. Id. at 91.
68. See id. at 91-92.
69. Id. at 92.
70. Id.
71. Id.
2012]
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the Presley estate formed Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. (EPE), as a corpora-
tion that licensed products bearing his name and likeness.72 EPE also owned
and controlled trademark registrations and copyrights.73
In 1980, a group of Elvis Presley fans, who called themselves the Elvis
Presley International Memorial Foundation (IMF), sought a charter as a
Tennessee not-for-profit corporation to support a new trauma center within
the Memphis and Shelby County hospital system.74 The Tennessee Secretary
of State denied IMF's application stating that "[t]he name Elvis Presley can-
not be used for this charter."75 The Presley estate discussed IMF's use of Mr.
Presley's name but declined to allow IMF an unrestricted right to use his
name and likeness. 76 Instead the Presley estate offered IMF a royalty-free
license to use Mr. Presley's identity under certain conditions.77 IMF refused
this offer.78 In 1981, the Tennessee Secretary of State issued a corporate
charter to IMF, and IMF began to raise funds to support the trauma center
named after Mr. Presley.79
In 1985, "[t]he Presley estate and [EPE] incorporated the Elvis Presley
Memorial Foundation, Inc. (Foundation) as a Tennessee not-for-profit cor-
poration."80 The Foundation raised funds to build a fountain in a shopping
center across from Mr. Presley's home.8' After the Foundation was formed,
any amicable relationship IMF had with the Presley estate and EPE deterio-
rated.82 On July 17, 1985, IMF filed suit against the Foundation to dissolve
the Foundation and to enjoin it from using a deceptively similar name.83 The
trial court allowed EPE to intervene as a defendant on the defendant Foun-
dation's behalf.84
The chancery court granted the Foundation's summary judgment mo-
tion and dismissed the complaint; IMF appealed.85 On appeal, the court
acknowledged the confusion between the right of privacy and the right of
publicity. 6 The issue at hand was whether an individual's right of publicity
72. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 92.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 92.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 93.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 93.
85. Id. at 91.
86. Id. at 93.
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was descendible at death under Tennessee law.87 The court briefly discussed
the origin of the right of privacy and each individual's "right to be left
alone. ' 88 The court noted that this privacy interest is "far different from a
celebrity's interest in controlling and exploiting the economic value of his
name and likeness." 89 It distinguished the right of publicity as a right sepa-
rate and independent from the right of privacy.90
The court then transitioned to a discussion of the right of property in
land and in chattel.91 Chattel includes intangible personal property such as "a
person's 'business,' a corporate name, a trade name and the good will of a
business. 92 A person's right of publicity is a form of intangible personal
property because it has economic value that can be possessed, used, as-
signed, and the subject of a contract.93
"[R]ecognizing that the right of publicity is descendible promotes...
[at least six] important policies . . . ,94 First, an individual has the right of
testamentary distribution.95 If a person's right of publicity is considered in-
tangible personal property in life, it remains property at death.96 Second, a
claim for unjust enrichment exists "against granting a windfall to an adver-
tiser who has no colorable claim" to use a person's identity for commercial
use, without that person's consent.97 Third, a person has an "expectation that
he is creating a valuable capital asset that will benefit his heirs and assigns
after his death. 98 This further recognizes a person's effort and financial
commitment to establishing his identity.99 Fourth, the right of publicity "rec-
ognizes the value of the contract rights of persons who have acquired the
right to use" someone else's name and likeness.1°° The value of any existing
contract made while the person was alive would be greatly diminished if a
person's name and likeness were to enter the public domain at death.0 1
Fifth, it "will further the public's interest in being free from deception with
87. Id. at 97.
88. Id. at 94.
89. Id.
90. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 94-97
91. Id. at 97.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 97-98.
97. Id. at 98.
98. Id. (citing Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Independence Day Dawning for the Right of
Publicity?, 17 U. C. DAVIs L. REv. 191, 212-13 (1983); Michael J. McLane, The Right of
Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption, and First Amendment Myths Threatening to
Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20 CAL. W. L. REv. 415, 421 (1983)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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regard to the sponsorship, approval or certification of goods and services. '
Finally, it "is consistent with the policy against unfair competition through
the use of deceptively similar corporate names.' 3 After this examination,
the court held that "Elvis Presley's right of publicity survived his death and
remain[ed] enforceable by his estate and those holding licenses from the
estate."'"
2. Tennessee Statutory Post-Mortem Right of Publicity
The Tennessee General Assembly added a cause of action for violation
of a person's right of publicity.'0 5 The purpose of The Personal Rights Pro-
tection Act of 1984 (TPRPA) is to protect individuals who use their names
for "endorsement purposes."'' 0 6 Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-25-1103
states:
(a) Every individual has a property right in the use of that person's name,
photograph, or likeness in any medium in any manner.
(b) The individual rights provided for in subsection (a) constitute proper-
ty rights and are freely assignable and licensable, and do not expire upon
the death of the individual so protected, whether or not such rights were
commercially exploited by the individual during the individual's life-
time, but shall be descendible to the executors, assigns, heirs, or devisees
of the individual so protected by this part.
10 7
Section 1105(a) states:
Any person who knowingly uses or infringes upon the use of another in-
dividual's name, photograph, or likeness in any medium, in any manner
directed to any person other than such individual, as an item of com-
merce for purposes of advertising products, merchandise, goods, or ser-
vices, or for purposes of fund raising, solicitation of donations, purchases
of products, merchandise, goods, or services, without such individual's
prior consent ... or in the case of a deceased individual, the consent of
102. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 99.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984, 1983-1984 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 945
(codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg.
Sess.)).
106. E.g., McKee v. Meltech, Inc., No. 10-2730, 2011 WL 1770461, at *12 (W.D. Tenn.
May 9, 2011) (quoting Reed v. Lifeweaver, LLC, No. 2:08-CV- 116, 2010 WL 1798704, at
*11 (E.D. Tenn. May 5, 2010)).
107. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103 (a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
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the executor or administrator, heirs, or devisees of such deceased indi-
vidual, shall be liable to a civil action. 08
Remedies include "damages, injunctive relief, and impoundment or de-
struction of the materials."' 9 Unauthorized use may detract from the value
of a person's identity which that person alone has the right to commercially
exploit.1 An injunction may be appropriate and "reasonable to prevent or
restrain the unauthorized use of an individual's name, photograph, or like-
ness." 111 Furthermore, "enjoining the ... [violator's] activities would serve
the public interest by protecting this right.
112
C. Georgia and the Post-Mortem Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is also recognized in Georgia, distinct from the
right of privacy,113 as a common law post-mortem right of publicity."4 These
rights extend to private citizens to prevent their identity from being "used
for the financial gain of the user without their consent."115
1. Martin Luther King, Jr. 's Estate and Common Law Post-Mortem
Right of Publicity
In this case, the plaintiffs were the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for
Social Change (the "Center"), Coretta Scott King, as administratrix of Dr.
King's estate, and Motown Record Corporation, as assignee of the rights to
several of Dr. King's copyrighted speeches. 16 The defendants owned a
business that sold plastic busts of Dr. King." 7 At least one of the defendants
sought endorsement and participation from the Center to market the bust but
the plaintiffs refused." 8 This defendant continued with marketing the bust
despite the plaintiffs' refusal." 9 The plaintiffs filed suit after demanding that
defendants stop further advertisements and bust sales. 20 During a hearing,
the district court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the defend-
108. Id. at § 47-25-1105(a).
109. Henderson, supra note 4, at 226-27.
110. Id.
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1106 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.).
112. E.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
113. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 694
F.2d 674, 674 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 680.
116. Id. at 675.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d at 675.
120. Id.
2012]
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ants from using the Center's name in promotion of the defendants' prod-
ucts.12" ' The district court also held "that the defendants had infringed...
[Dr.] King['s] copyrights."' 22 The plaintiffs appealed the partial denial of the
preliminary judgment to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which certi-
fied four questions:
(1) Is the "right of publicity" recognized in Georgia as a right distinct
from the right of privacy? (2) If the answer to question (1) is affirmative,
does the "right of publicity" survive the death of its owner?...[I]s the
right inheritable and devisable? (3) If the answer to question (2) is also
affirmative, must the owner have commercially exploited the right before
it can survive his death? (4) Assuming the affirmative answers to ques-
tions (1), (2)[] and (3), what is the guideline to be followed in defining
commercial exploitation... ?,123
For the first issue, the Eleventh Circuit quoted Pavesich v. New Eng-
land Life Insurance: 124
It is not necessary in this case to hold.., that the mere fact that a man
has become what is called a public character, either by aspiring to public
office, or by holding public office, or by exercising a profession which
places him before the public, or by engaging in a business which has
necessarily a public nature, gives to every one the right to print and cir-
culate his picture.
25
Furthermore, it acknowledged that Georgia recognizes the rights of
private citizens "not to have their names and photographs used for the finan-
cial gain of the user without their consent, where such use is not authorized
as an exercise of freedom of the press."'' 26 The court held "that appropriation
of another's name and likeness.., without consent and for financial gain..
. [was] a tort in Georgia" and applied to a private citizen, entertainer, public
official, or public figure.
27
The second issue the court addressed was whether the right of publicity
survives the death of its owner, and whether that right is inheritable and
devisable.2 8 The court indicated that a right of publicity that survives the
owner's death encourages effort and creativity because the economic value
121. Id. at 676.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
125. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d at. at 677-78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 680.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 681.
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of that right could continue after death. 2 9 It also held that the right of public-
ity is assignable and inheritable. 3 °
The third issue the court addressed was whether one must commercial-
ly exploit his right of publicity before it can survive after his death.' 3' The
court opined that this was not a requirement in order for the right of publici-
ty to survive after death because "a person who avoids exploitation during
life is entitled to have his image protected against exploitation after death
just as much if not more than a person who exploited his image during
life.' 32 As a minister and civil rights activist, Dr. King did not commercially
exploit his name and likeness during his lifetime. 33 Even so, after his death,
his family (through his estate) remained in control of his right of publicity in
his identity to preserve and extend his legacy and ideals and to prevent un-
authorized exploitation of the same by others. 134 Because Dr. King was not
required to have commercially exploited his right of publicity during his
lifetime for it to survive his death, the court had no need to address the last
question concerning the guideline for determining "commercial exploita-
tion."'135
D. California Statutory and Common Law Post-Mortem Right of Publicity
In California, "the right of publicity is both a statutory and a common
law right."'' 36 The statutory right of publicity complements the common law
right of publicity, which arises from the tort of invasion of privacy. 37 "The
common law and statutory claims are similar but not identical .... 9,138 in
California, the right of publicity has been deemed to have some social utility
and is considered a protected form of intellectual property.'39 Some consid-
erations suggesting that the right of publicity may have value include the
time, money, and energy expended to develop one's image, reputation, and
129. Id. at 682.
130. Id.
131. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d at 682.
132. Id. at 683.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001); see
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344-3344.1 (Westlaw through ch. 4 of 2012 Reg. Sess.).
137. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 799.
138. E.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
139. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 804.
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skill.' 40 California cases have also employed the term "likeness" concerning
replication of a person's features.'
14
1. California Common Law Post-Mortem Right of Publicity
To state a claim under California's common law right of publicity, a
plaintiff must show "(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the
appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to defendant's advantage,
commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury."'142
2. California Statutory Post-Mortem Right of Publicity.
In California:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, pho-
tograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases
of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior
consent ... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or
persons injured as a result thereof.143
California also provides protection under a post-mortem right of pub-
licity:
(a)(1) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signa-
ture, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, mer-
chandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior
consent from the person or persons ... shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
(b) The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely
transferable or descendible, in whole or in part, by contract or by means
of any trust or any other testamentary instrument, executed before or af-
ter January 1, 1985. 44
An example of the right of publicity protecting the use of a person's
likeness on products is Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup,
140. Id.
141. E.g., Nurmi v. Peterson, CV 88-5436-WMB, 1989 WL 407484, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 1989).
142. E.g., Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Keller v.
Electronics Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
143. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344(a) (Westlaw through ch. 4 of 2012 Reg. Sess.); see also
Kirby, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d at 612.
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Westlaw through ch. 4 of 2012 Reg. Sess.).
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Inc.145 In Comedy III, the plaintiff, Comedy I1, was the registered owner of
all rights to the comedy act The Three Stooges."4 The defendant, Gary
Saderup, was an artist who made a living making charcoal drawings of ce-
lebrities in the form of lithographs, which were used on T-shirts. 147 Saderup
sold T-shirts bearing a likeness of The Three Stooges, without Comedy III's
consent. 148 The Superior Court entered judgment awarding damages and
permanent injunctive relief to Comedy 11.149 Saderup appealed, and the
Court of Appeals modified the judgment, striking the injunction while main-
taining the award of damages, attorneys' fees and costs.' ° Saderup appealed
to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the lithographs and T-shirts
did not constitute an advertisement, endorsement, or sponsorship of any
product. 5' The California Supreme Court disagreed, noting that Saderup's
lithographic prints and T-shirts of The Three Stooges were tangible personal
property. 52 It held that "[b]y producing and selling such lithographs and T-
shirts, Saderup thus used the likeness of the Three Stooges 'on... products,
merchandise, or goods' within the meaning of the statute."'5 3
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Alternatives to protection under a right of publicity include (1) an inva-
sion of a right of privacy, (2) trademark infringement, and (3) copyright
infringement. Each of these protects different interests, yet cannot substitute
for the protection afforded by a post-mortem right of publicity.
A. Arkansas and the Right of Privacy
The right of privacy is the expectation of a person to be left alone.5 4
Unless provided otherwise by statute, common law tort claims are not as-
signable,'55 do not survive after death of the victim, and would not be de-
scendible to one's heirs. 156 "[A]n invasion of privacy claim 'exists only if
the defendant's conduct was such that he should have realized that it would
145. 21 P.3d 797,799 (Cal. 2001).
146. Id. at 800.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 800-01.
149. Id. at 801.
150. Id.
151. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 801-02.
152. Id. at 802.
153. Id.
154. E.g., Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 415 (8th Cir. 1978).
155. E.g., Mallory v. Hartsfield, Almand & Grisham, LLP, 350 Ark. 304, 309, 86 S.W.3d
863, 866 (2002).
156. E.g., Westridge v. Byrd, 37 Ark. App. 72, 73, 823 S.W.2d 930, 930 (1992).
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be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities."" 57 With a right of publici-
ty analysis, an expectation of privacy is not a requirement.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement position on
the invasion of the right of privacy.158 Other jurisdictions within the Eighth
Circuit have also adopted, or at least acknowledged, a cause of action for an
invasion of the right of privacy. 59 An invasion of the right of privacy is di-
vided into four categories: "(a) [u]nreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
of another ... ; (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness . . . ; (c)
unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life ... ; or (d) publicity
that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public . . . 60
Appropriation of one's name or likeness is the closest option of the four
categories, under an invasion of privacy, to protect one's name, image or
likeness.'
The Restatement provides that "[olne who appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of privacy."' 162 The Restatement further instructs that appropria-
tion applies whenever one uses another's name, likeness or reputation "for
his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one,
and even though the benefit sought to be obtained in not a pecuniary
one."163As an intentional act, invasion of one's right of privacy is an inten-
tional tort; therefore, an incidental use of someone else's name or likeness is
not an appropriation and not actionable 64 For example, mere publication of
the person's likeness in a commercial newspaper or magazine does not cre-
ate a cause of action for misappropriation.
165
Only a few reported cases in Arkansas discuss appropriation as a cause
of action for an invasion of privacy. 66 In Stanley v. General Media Commu-
nications, two young women voluntarily participated in a contest where
157. E.g., McKee v. Meltech, Inc., No. 10-2730, 2011 WL 1770461 at *11 (W.D. Tenn.
2011) (quoting West Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tenn. 2001)).
158. See Dodrill v. Ark. Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 637, 590 S.W.2d 840, 844-45
(1979); Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495,497-98, 353 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1962).
159. Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publ'g Co., 76 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa 1956); Lake v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998); Sofka v. Thai, 662 S.W.2d 502,
509 (Mo. 1983); Sabrina W. v. Willman, 540 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995);
Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1998); Montgomery Ward v.
Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806, 808 (S.D. 1979).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
161. See, e.g., Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1247 (D. Minn.
2005).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
163. Id. at cmt. b.
164. E.g., Kovatovich v. K-Mart Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d 975, 987 (D. Minn. 1999).
165. Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc'ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706 (W.D. Ark. 2001).
166. Id; LasikPlus Murphy, M.D., P.A. v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 2d 886, 899
(E.D. Ark. 2011); Olan Mills, Inc. of Tex., 234 Ark. at 499, 353 S.W.2d at 24.
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their photographs were taken. 67 The contest was held in a public place;
therefore, the women did not have any expectation of privacy while partici-
pating. 68 One of the photographs featuring the two women was published in
Penthouse magazine, with a caption noting the activity in which they partic-
ipated 69 The women filed suit against the defendant publisher alleging in-
vasion of privacy by appropriation, along with false light invasion of priva-
cy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.7 ° The plaintiffs
were concerned that nationwide publication of their photographs in the
magazine would damage their reputation.
1 71
The Eastern District of Arkansas noted that, although the plaintiffs
were identified by name and hometown in the publication, there was no evi-
dence that the plaintiffs were easily identifiable to the general public. 72 Fur-
ther, courts have distinguished between the use of a professional athlete's
names and facts (fair use) and use of such information for commercial pur-
poses (right of publicity infringement).1 73 After finding that no reasonable
jury could conclude that the publication intended or expected that customers
would buy the magazine on the basis of the photo at issue, the court dis-
missed plaintiffs' claim for invasion of privacy by appropriation. 174
B. Arkansas and Trademark Law
Both the Lanham Act and Arkansas law define a trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person
to identify and distinguish the goods of such person, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others, and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."' 75 This definition ap-
plies to a trademark (or service mark) regardless of whether the mark is reg-
istered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, secretary of
state, or even unregistered. 76 Developing trademark rights in association
with particular goods or services requires consumer recognition of the mark
167. "The contest rules required each participant to place a blindfold over her eyes, un-
wrap a condom, and place the condom on a 'demonstrator,' which was a white plastic phal-
lus." Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
168. id.
169. Id. at 704-05.
170. Id. at 704.
171. See id. at 706.
172. Id.
173. E.g., Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Christian Bros., Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (D.
Minn. 1996).
174. Stanley, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 706.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); accordARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-201(10) (Repl. 2011).
176. See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1987).
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as an identifier of the source of such goods or services.177 Goodwill and rep-
utation, derived from the perceived economic value obtained, also accompa-
ny trademarks.178
The Lanham Act prohibits use of a trademark by one that:
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another per-
son, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities by another person, or . . . in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, quali-
ties, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities. 1
79
Trademark rights generally do not extend to a person's name, unless
that person has used it to function as a trademark for particular goods or
services.18° In certain circumstances, a person's name or image may be used
as a trademark (or service mark). 8' In this situation, the person would not
necessarily have carte blanch rights to any and all uses of the words forming
his name.'82 Any right to use his name as a trademark would depend upon
whether he is the first (or "senior") user of the trademark used in connection
with those particular goods or services. 1
83
C. Arkansas and Copyright Law
Another avenue for protecting one's life work is to protect works of art
under copyright law. Subject matter eligible for copyright protection in-
cludes:
literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words; dra-
matic works, including any accompanying music; pantomimes and cho-
reographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pic-
177. Id. at 625-26.
178. See, e.g., id. at 625; 1 MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:15 (4th ed. 2011).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
180. See In re Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. 554, 555 (T.T.A.B. 1977); Holiday Inns, Inc. v.
Trump, 617 F. Supp. 1443, 1465 (D. N.J. 1985); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13:2 (4th ed. 2011).
181. See In Re Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 555; Holiday Inns, Inc., 617 F. Supp. at 1465; 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13:2 (4th ed.
2011).
182. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 13:2 (4th ed. 2011).
183. See Holiday Inns, Inc., 617 F. Supp. at 1464.
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tures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural
works.'84
These works of art must be fixed into a tangible medium of expression,
such as in writing or a recording.' Subject matter that is not eligible for
copyright protection includes an idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 6
Copyright protection lasts the life of the author plus seventy years after
the author's death. 187As personal property, it may be assigned and is de-
scendible' 8 s The owner of copyrights has the exclusive right to reproduce
the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies of the
work to the public, to perform the work publicly, and to display the work
publicly.1 8 9 Copyright infringement does not generally extend to unauthor-
ized use of a person's identity because a cause of action for copyright in-
fringement requires ownership of a valid copyright and copying of the copy-
righted work. 190
"As described by the Eighth Circuit, the right of publicity protects 'the
right of an individual to reap the rewards of his or her endeavors.'""91 Copy-
right, on the other hand, protects the author's exclusive right to reproduce,
distribute, perform, or display expressive works. 192 Thus, the right of public-
ity protects very different rights than copyright. 1
93
IV. CONCLUSION
Adopting a post-mortem right of publicity in Arkansas would protect
Arkansans from use of their name, image, or likeness for commercial pur-
poses, without their consent. This adoption should expressly provide that the
right of publicity survives the owner's death, wherein this right is descendi-
ble and inheritable as personal property. Furthermore, it should be available
for private individuals as well as celebrities, public figures, and public offi-
cials. Exploitation or commercialization during a person's lifetime should
not be a prerequisite before the right of publicity can descend to that per-
184. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
185. Id.
186. Id. at § 102(b).
187. Id. at § 302(a).
188. Id. at § 201(d).
189. Id. at § 106.
190. E.g., Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 1992).
191. Dryer v. Nat'l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. Minn. 2010) (quot-
ing C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007)).
192. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
193. Dryer, 689 F. Supp at 1121.
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son's heirs. This post-mortem right of publicity should be held to be a right
that is distinct and independent from the tort invasion of privacy by appro-
priation. Arkansas has already adopted the four categories for the right of
privacy. According to the courts within the Eighth Circuit, this supports a
prediction that the Arkansas Supreme Court would also adopt a right of pub-
licity. It is in Arkansas's best interest to protect its residents and the public
by joining the jurisdictions that have codified and adopted a post-mortem
right of publicity.
